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2Abstract. Governments use redistributive policies to favor rel-
atively unproductive economic sectors. Traditional economic wis-
dom teaches that the government should instead buy out the agents
in these sectors, and let them relocate to more productive sectors.
We show that redistribution to a sector whose agents have highly
correlated incomes generates an insurance value. Taking this insur-
ance value into account, a buy-out is not sufficient to compensate
the agents in the sector for relocating. In fact, it may be efficient
for the government to sustain agents in an activity that, while less
productive, is subject to correlated income shocks. US data sug-
gests that indeed, sectors that receive transfers are subject to more
correlated income shocks than others.
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Clever economists have displayed an obtuseness in this
matter that is difficult to believe. They will say, not year
after year but generation after generation: “Parliament,
do you not realize that free trade would increase the
national income?” As if the Parliament did not know
this! At their most sophisticated, these economists have
added: “If you must aid farmers or whomever, tax a
portion of the larger income obtained with free trade
and give the revenue directly to the people the tariff
was intended to help.” As if they had studied the com-
parative efficiency of subsidizing a given group by tariffs
as compared with general taxes and selective subsidies.
Stigler (1982)
Redistributive policies are ubiquitous. Economists have a good un-
derstanding of why redistribution exists, but not why it takes the form
it takes. Often, governments redistribute through tariffs, quotas, and
other distortionary means. Why do they not give a direct subsidy to
the policies’ recipients, and avoid the deadweight loss from the dis-
tortionary redistribution? A salient example is the transfer that a
protected industry receives from a tariff on international trade. This
protection keeps factors of production tied to a relatively unproductive
sector, when these factors could relocate (and would without protec-
tion) to a different, more productive, sector of the economy. The mon-
etary value of the transfers is small compared to the total loss from
the distortions introduced by the policy. For instance, Hufbauer and
Elliott (1994) calculate that tariffs for the 21 most protected industries
in the US cost consumers $32 billion. After subtracting the producer’s
gains and tariff revenues, the net loss for the economy is $10.7 billion.
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If the government wants to redistribute wealth to favor a sector of
the economy, it can choose among several policies that would give the
industry the same raise in wealth. As detailed, for example, by Rodrik
(1994), the most efficient policy would be a one-time lump grant to
the industry, and no protection thereafter—a buy-out. This kind of
redistribution does not affect the incentives to locate factors in the
most productive sector. Increasingly costlier ways to redistribute are:
Subsidies to employment, which keep agents tied to less productive
sectors; subsidies to production, which create the incentives to raise
production in a relatively unproductive industry; and tariffs, which
make consumers pay more for their products and obstruct the gains
from international trade. The puzzle is why redistributive policies take
a form that keeps factors employed in less productive sectors, and why
the government does not instead buy out these sectors.
In this paper, we offer an answer to the puzzle. We argue that redis-
tributive policies that keep agents in a relatively unproductive sector
may in fact be more efficient than a buy-out. The reason is that the
political process that generates redistribution is such that it provides
agents with insurance, in addition to wealth. We first note that re-
distributive transfers are responsive to the demands made by agents
in different sectors, and that demands depend on agents’ well-being.
In particular, other things being equal, an agent is more likely to de-
mand a transfer for her sector when she receives a negative shock than
when she receives a positive shock. As a consequence, agents in sec-
tors where income shocks are highly correlated will be more cohesive in
their demands for sectoral transfers. Hence, a given agent who receives
a negative shock will obtain a higher transfer in a high-correlation, co-
hesive, sector than in other sectors, because there will be more agents
like her demanding transfers to the sector. An agent is therefore bet-
ter insured by the redistributive policies in a cohesive sector than in
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the rest of the economy, and if she accepts a buy-out she loses the
insurance.
Belonging to a cohesive group has a value that is not captured by the
calculations of deadweight loss. To buy out an agent from a cohesive
sector, one must give her more than the expected transfer she would
receive in the sector: one must compensate her for the insurance she
loses when, engaged in other economic activities, she belongs to less
cohesive groups. In other words, it may be cheap for a government to
give a certain level of utility to a group if it engages in an activity that,
while less productive, is subject to correlated individual shocks.
A first look at the publicly-available data supports the explanation
we have laid out. Our theory has a clear testable implication: The
data should show a positive relation between correlation of incomes
and tariff protection. The publicly-available US data suggests that
this is indeed the case. That said, the emphasis of our work has been
on developing a theory, and further empirical work is clearly needed to
test our theory conclusively.
Our explanation follows the arguments in Becker (1976) and Stigler
(1982) that, unless agents make systematic mistakes, redistribution
must take a less inefficient form than alternative policies. Tariffs, they
argue, may be inefficient, but they must be the most efficient way of
performing the redistributive task they perform.
Our first results show how a benevolent government may want to
maintain agents in an unproductive sector; in a sense, we carry out
the calculation that Stigler suggests in our quote. We find a specific
reason for why the seemingly inefficient policies that keep agents in
unproductive sectors may be better than the alternatives. They may
be better because they take advantage of the correlation in incomes—a
technological feature of the sector in question—to provide agents with
higher utility, via insurance, for a given expected value of transfers.
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We then show, in a model of political participation, that the insurance
effect is present even when the government is not explicitly trying to
insure the agents.
We can make Stigler’s suggested comparison more explicit: If a gov-
ernment wants to redistribute income to agents who receive a nega-
tive shock, it may use a system of individual income taxation. Varian
(1980) emphasizes how income taxation affects the incentives to work,
and how a social planner would have to trade off the efficiency loss from
reducing the incentives to work with the insurance effect from reduc-
ing the variance of individual income.1 Our results, on the other hand,
highlight that group transfers also provide social insurance, without
the adverse effects on incentives to work. If the income shocks in a sec-
tor are highly correlated, then the average income of the sector serves
as an adequate public signal of the individual income of all agents in
the sector: When the sector receives a negative shock, all agents are
affected. The government can then offer transfers to all agents in a
particular sector when the sector is poor, and tax the agents when the
sector is rich, and at the same time keep the tax on marginal individ-
ual income at zero. The government may offer these transfers out of
concern for social welfare or strategically to entice voters.
In our results, the government insures sectors against aggregate shocks
in an economy without private insurance markets. What if there are
private markets for the relevant risks? We note first that in practice
it is often the government and not markets who provides insurance, at
least in the sectors that are relevant for our paper. Second, we present
a version of our model with private-insurance markets for the aggre-
gate shocks under consideration. We show how in this economy with
1Forteza (1999, 2001) has also studied this trade-off, with emphasis on the time
inconsistency of avoiding social insurance.
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private insurance markets, government redistribution still sustains an
unproductive sector and increases social welfare.
The literature that tries to explain the form of redistributive policies
is not large. Dixit and Londregan’s (1995) and Mitchell and Moro’s
(2006) work is closest to ours, in the sense that they too explain why
governments do not buy out the recipients of redistributive policies. To
ease the exposition in the sequel, we shall refer to a generic relatively-
unproductive sector as “farming.” Dixit and Londregan argue that, if
the government cannot commit to future transfers, individual farm-
ers will prefer to remain farmers and not incur the costs of relocating
to another sector. In their model, which builds on the political com-
petition models of Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Dixit and Lon-
dregan (1996), the transfers are such that farmers who relocate are
taxed to subsidize farmers who do not relocate. Dixit and Londregan’s
explanation relies on the farmers being in a coordination failure, each
individually failing to internalize the social gains from the relocation
of the group. Our explanation of the puzzle relies on quite different
mechanisms; we view it as complementary to Dixit and Londregan’s.
We should mention, though, that it may be possible for a government
to break the coordination failure in Dixit and Londregan’s model by
offering farmers a conditional buy-out offer—a buy-out offer that only
comes in place if most farmers accept (offers of this kind are used in
corporate take overs, for example).
Mitchell and Moro (2006) present a model where there is uncertainty
about the degree of inefficiency in farming. In particular, they assume
that only farmers know how much they need to be compensated in
order to agree to a buy out. Mitchell and Moro show that seemingly
inefficient transfers to farming may in fact be efficient, conditional on
the informational asymmetry in their model. Our explanation relies on
very different mechanisms, but we have in common the conclusion that
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policies which are traditionally regarded as inefficient may be efficient,
once the right constraints are taken into account.
Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) present a model where farmers favor
policies that induce more agents to enter farming, because they gain
more political power in the future. Their explanation requires that
larger groups obtain larger per capita transfers. Acemoglu and Robin-
son explain why incumbent farmers favor the inefficient entry-inducing
policy over a non-distortionary lump-sum transfer. But their model
does not explain—nor does it claim to explain—the stated puzzle: a
government would still benefit from buying out the incumbent farmers
by giving them the present value of the transfers they would obtain
with the larger group size. Interestingly, Acemoglu and Robinson’s
explanation implies that sectors with larger specificity of factors re-
ceive smaller transfers. Our explanation has, if anything, the opposite
testable implication (we discuss this issue in more detail below).
Dal Bo´ and Dal Bo´ (2004) present a three-sector model with one pro-
ductive labor-intensive sector, one productive capital-intensive sector,
and one purely wasteful sector which is also labor-intensive. They show
that policies—such as tariffs—that sustain wages in a less-productive,
labor-intensive, sector may be optimal, as they prevent workers from
engaging in purely wasteful activities.
Coate and Morris (1995) consider policies that may or may not be
inefficient, and show that the government may use these policies, even
when it knows they are inefficient, because they benefit an interest
group in a covert way. Coate and Morris explain policies whose inef-
ficiency is uncertain. The puzzle we try to explain, as stated in the
literature, refers to unambiguous policies. Coate and Morris deal with
essentially a different phenomenon than our puzzle.2
2Dixit and Londregan (1995) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) make the same
point about Coate and Morris (1995).
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Socially Optimal Redistribution
We shall demonstrate our point in a stylized model with two large
groups. First, we consider a benevolent government who wants to use
transfers to insure individuals. We show that the government may
want to sustain a group because its income correlation makes transfers
effective as insurance. As a result, the government may want to sustain
a less productive sector, if it has high income correlation.
Second, we consider politicians offering transfers to voters, in a prob-
abilistic voting model. We show how income correlation can make a
sector more cohesive politically, and as a result be better insured by
the process of political competition. The second model reduces to the
first model of a benevolent government, and our result on maintaining
a group with high correlation—a cohesive group—holds.
Consider two groups of agents, IA and IB, with a continuum of
agents in each group; assume that Im = [0, 1], m = A,B.
3 Agents are
identical, with one exception: the agents in group A receive perfectly
correlated wealth-shocks, while those in group B receive independent
wealth-shocks. The marginal distribution of wealth is the same for all
agents, but the joint distribution is different across groups. Concretely,
individual wealth, wi, is drawn from a continuous distribution G with
full support on [0, 1], for both groups. The difference is that the wi in
group A are perfectly correlated, so that i, i′ ∈ IA and wi = w implies
wi′ = w. The wi in group B are independent; that is, if i, i
′ ∈ IB, then
the event wi = w conveys no information about the realization of wi′ .
Each agent i derives utility from consumption. An agent’s consump-
tion is given by her wealth and a government transfer, which can be
3The assumption of a continuum of agents is analytically convenient. We ignore
the technical issues discussed in Judd (1985) and Feldman and Gilles (1985).
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negative or positive. A benevolent government aims to maximize so-
cial welfare by choosing transfers tm to the individuals of group m. The
utility of agent i in group m is
v(wi + tm)
We assume that v : R+ → R is increasing, continuously differen-
tiable, strictly concave.
A budget constraint on the government requires that the transfers
must be balanced, so that tA = −tB.
The assumption that the government can only implement group (not
individual) transfers is crucial. Assuming that individual wealth is
exogenous and unobservable, only group transfers are possible. In a
more general model, the government could set up an income tax system,
which would serve to redistribute wealth across individuals, rather than
across groups. But one can interpret our model as a reduced form of
the more general model. Individual transfers affect agents’ incentives
to work; group transfers (when groups are large) do not. If income is
taxed and later redistributed to those with less wealth, then every agent
has lower incentives to work and would optimally choose to shirk or
enjoy more leisure, with the consequent loss of production and wealth
for the society. As a consequence, one would imagine that individual
transfers would not fully insure the agents, and that group transfers
would still be used. Our approach would apply to group transfers and
after-tax wealth that still submit the agents to a significant degree of
risk.
The government’s choice of transfers (tA, tB) solves the following
problem:
max
∫
v(wA + tA(wA))dG(wA) +
∫∫
v(w˜ + tB(wA))dG(w˜)dG(wA)
s.t. tA(wA) + tB(wA) = 0
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We refer to the government’s objective function as social welfare.
The government can condition the transfers on the wealth of group A,
which is observable, and thus provides insurance by subsidizing group
A when this group is poor, and taxing it when the group receives a
high wealth shock.
For any level of wealth in group A, the government redistributes
wealth from one group to another until the average marginal utility
from consumption is equal in both groups.
Let Tm be the expected transfer to an individual in group m. That
is, Tm =
∫
t∗m(w)dG(w), m = A,B. The first result is that belonging to
group A and receiving the corresponding wealth-dependent transfers
is better than receiving the expected transfer that accrue to group-A
agents. Whereas, belonging to group B is worse than receiving the
expected transfer that accrue to group-B members.
Lemma 1. The government’s optimal transfers t∗A, t
∗
B satisfy:
(1) Ev(wA + t
∗
A(wA)) > Ev(wA + TA), and
(2) Ev(wB + t
∗
B(wA)) < Ev(wB + TB),
where wA and wB are the (random) wealths of group-A and
group-B individuals, respectively.
Proof. To save on notation, let x(w) = t∗A(wA) = −t∗B(wA) and T = TA.
The first-order condition of the government’s maximization problem
requires that, for every w:
(1) v′(w + x(w)) =
∫ 1
0
v′(w˜ − x(w))dG(w˜).
Since v′ is decreasing, x(w) is monotone decreasing. Then there is w
such that if w ≤ w then x(w) ≥ T and if w ≥ w then x(w) ≤ T .
First, if w ≤ w,
v(w+x(w))− v(w+T ) =
∫ x(w)
T
v′(w+ s)ds ≥ v′(w+x(w)) [x(w)− T ]
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and if w ≥ w then
|v(w + x(w))− v(w + T )| =
∫ T
x(w)
v′(w+s)ds ≤ v′(w+x(w)) |x(w)− T | .
So, either way,
(2) v(w + x(w))− v(w + T ) ≥ v′(w + x(w)) [x(w)− T ] .
Then∫
v(w + x(w))− v(w + T )dG(w) ≥
∫
v′(w + x(w)) [x(w)− T ] dG(w)
=
∫ ∫
v′(w˜ − x(w))dG(w˜) [x(w)− T ] dG(w)
=
∫
l(x˜) [x˜− T ] dH(x˜)
> 0.
The first equality is from Equation 1. The second equality comes from
letting H be the distribution of the random variable x(w), and
l(x) =
∫
v′(w˜ − x)dG(w˜).
The last inequality follows because l is a positive, strictly monotone
increasing function and
∫
[x˜− T ] dH(x) = 0 by a standard argument in
probability theory. So this proves thatEv(wA+t
∗
A(wA)) > Ev(wA+TA).
The statement for group B is immediate because v is concave, and wA
and wB are independent.
The intuition behind the result is straightforward: Since the transfers
only depend on the wealth shock of group A, agents in A receive some
insurance against this shock. Group-A agents receive positive trans-
fers when they are poor, and pay transfers when they are rich, while
transfers to B-agents do not depend on their own wealth, but on that
of group-A members. For B-agents, transfers are a mean-preserving
spread over TB. Since agents are risk averse the result follows.
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Our second result is that twice the expected transfer to A-agents is
not enough to compensate them for becoming B-agents.
Proposition 2. An agent prefers to be a member of group A than to
receive 2TA for sure and then become a member of group B. Formally:
Ev(wA + t
∗
A(wA)) > Ev(wB + 2TA + t
∗
B(wA)).
Proof. The result follows from Lemma 1, because
Ev(wA + TA) = Ev(wB + TA)
= Ev(wB + 2TA + TB)
> Ev(wB + 2TA + t
∗
B(wA)).
The first inequality holds because individual wealth is drawn from the
same distribution G for both groups. The second equality follows from
the budget balance requirement TA = −TB. The inequality follows the
concavity of the function v.
The results should be interpreted as follows. Suppose the government
considers buying out agents in group A by offering a compensation for
relocating to group B. Consider two possible offers, an individual and
a collective buy-out.
In an individual buy-out, an A-agent relocates to group B, but she
imagines that the redistributive policy remains in place, so that group-
A agents continue receiving transfers t∗A financed by −t∗B. Then she
gives up an expected transfer of TA as an A-agent, and pays an ex-
pected −TA as a B-agent, so the relevant compensation would be 2TA.
Proposition 2 says that 2TA is not enough compensation for the pro-
posed relocation.
In a collective buy-out, all the members of A are bought out, and
there is no more redistribution. The relevant compensation is then TA,
as an A agent loses the expected value of transfers. But since there
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are now no transfers, and the marginal distribution of wealth is the
same for both groups, Statement (1) in Lemma 1 implies that TA is
not enough compensation for the relocation.
In either case, the insurance value of belonging to group A makes
the buy-out less efficient than a simple calculation of expected transfers
would suggest.
In fact, social welfare strictly decreases if group A is bought out. To
see this, first note that the social welfare with transfers is necessarily
higher than without transfers, as t∗A and t
∗
B are not identically zero when
v is strictly concave. Second, since the marginal distribution of wealth
is G in both sectors, fixing the transfers at zero in all states yields the
same individual expected utility for every agent as a forced relocation
of all A members to group B with no compensation yields -with no
transfers, agents are indifferent about group membership. Third, a
buy out with compensation TA 6= 0 reduces social welfare relative to a
buy out with no compensation, since it represents a mean-preserving
spread in the distribution of wealth of risk-averse agents by making
some richer and some poorer.
As we mentioned in the introduction, the question is why the govern-
ment does not buy out less productive sectors. Yet in our model, both
groups had identical (marginal) wealth distributions. Our modeling
assumption sought to identify and isolate the insurance effect caused
by a group’s cohesiveness, but the results have obvious implications for
truly less productive groups.
Suppose that sector A is less productive, so that wealth in sector A
is wA − α for some fixed productivity gap α > 0. If the productivity
gap is small relative to the insurance effect we have identified, it is
second-best efficient to sustain sector A; second-best, that is, to some
ideal transfers that could depend on agents’ individual levels of wealth.
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Corollary 3. There is α∗ such that, if α ≤ α∗, then buying out group
A leads to a decrease in social welfare.
The corollary is straightforward: For α = 0, it is strictly better in
terms of social welfare to keep sector A over buying it out; it follows
from continuity of the utility functions that the sum of expected utili-
ties is still strictly higher keeping sector A afloat with state-dependent
transfers if the productivity gap in favor of B is positive but small
enough. On the other hand, it is efficient to buy out a sector if this
sector is sufficiently less productive, despite how costly it may be to
compensate individuals for the insurance effect we identify. In general,
there is a trade-off between the productivity gains determined by α
and the size of the insurance effect caused by a sector’s cohesiveness.
The model we have developed demonstrates the insurance value of
transfers to cohesive groups. However, it does so abstracting from
any political considerations, adopting the convenient but unrealistic
approach of a social planner. In the remainder of the section we show
that the same results follow from the model of political competition
with probabilistic voting due to Lindbeck and Weibull (1987).
In Lindbeck and Weibull’s model, two parties compete for votes by
offering transfers—in a sense they buy votes. Crucially, a voter is more
willing to sell her vote when she is poor than when she is rich, so
transfers are more effective, and therefore higher, when they are given
to a poor group. As a result, insurance is naturally built into Lindbeck
and Weibull’s model.4
4See Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Grossman and Helpman (2001) for a
discussion of this model, and Hillman (1982) for a contrast between social welfare
and political support concerns for enacting redistributive policies.
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The two groups of agents IA and IB are now voters.
5
Two political parties, Y and Z compete for the votes of the agents.
A generic party is denoted by j. We assume (following Lindbeck and
Weibull) that voters have some intrinsic preference for one of the par-
ties, but parties do not know this preference.
Each voter i derives utility from consumption, ci, and from which
party is in office. Voter i’s utility is{
v(ci) + ai if Y wins
v(ci) + bi if Z wins.
The numbers ai and bi reflect the voter’s preference for parties Y and Z,
respectively.
Each party j promises transfers tjm to the individuals of groupm. So,
if party j wins, voter i of group m consumes ci = wi + t
j
m. Substitute
ci in voter i’s utility, and we conclude that i votes for party Y if
bi − ai < v(wi + tYm)− v(wi + tZm).
The parties do not know the values of bi− ai. But they believe each
bi − ai is independently and identically distributed according to some
distribution F . Then the probability that some voter i ∈ Im votes for
Y is
F
[
v(wi + t
Y
m)− v(wi + tZm)
]
.
The timing of Lindbeck and Weibull’s political game is as follows:
(1) Wealth levels are realized.
(2) Each party j = {Y, Z} offers balanced per-capita transfers
(tjA, t
j
B). Each party’s objective is to maximize the expected
number of votes it receives.
(3) Elections are held.
5We depart from Lindbeck andWeibull (1987) in assuming a continuum of voters.
They have an arbitrary number of groups, with a finite number of voters in each.
We believe this difference does not drives the substance of our results.
COHESION, INSURANCE AND REDISTRIBUTION. 17
The parties learn the realized distributions of wealth: they learn the
value of group-A agents’ wealth, as their realized distribution is always
degenerate, and know that the distribution of group-B voters’ wealth is
G. The latter is constant, so parties condition transfers on the realized
wealth of group-A voters.
Given wealth w for group-A voters, and promised group transfers
(tjA, t
j
B), the expected number of votes for Y in group A is∫ 1
0
F
[
v(w + tYA)− v(w + tZA)
]
di = F
[
v(w + tYA)− v(w + tZA)
]
,
and the expected number of votes for Y in group B is∫ 1
0
F
[
v(w˜ + tYB)− v(w˜ + tZB)
]
dG(w˜).
Given wealth w for the group-A voters, party Y wants to maximize
(and Z minimize)
F
[
v(w + tYA)− v(w + tZA)
]
+
∫ 1
0
F
[
v(w˜ + tYB)− v(w˜ + tZB)
]
dG(w˜).
We assume that the distribution function F is differentiable, with
convex and compact non-singleton support, and strictly positive den-
sity on its support.
Proposition 4. There is a unique Nash equilibrium of the political
competition game. This equilibrium is symmetric, and both parties
propose the vector of per-capita transfers (t∗A, t
∗
B) that maximize social
welfare.
The proposition follows easily from Lindbeck and Weibull’s (1987)
results.
The equilibrium transfers coincide with the transfers chosen by a
benevolent government. Sector A is not bought out, but rather, state-
dependent transfers insure its members and provide an additional value
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that makes them better off than receiving merely a compensation in
the amount of the expected transfer.
If the productivity gap in favor or sector B is small, relative to the
insurance value of the cohesive groups, both a benevolent government
and a vote-maximizing party would prefer to maintain sector A over
buying out its members.
Limitations of Private Insurance
We have derived our results under the assumption that there are no
private insurance markets. We have shown how seemingly inefficient
policies may in effect be providing insurance that the market does not
provide, so the role of insurance markets is important in our results.
Private insurance contracts may provide payments conditional on in-
dividual or aggregate shocks. Insurance against individual shocks could
guarantee a first-best outcome, and hence affect our results. However,
a standard moral-hazard argument precludes insurance of individual
shocks; in the words of Arrow (1968): “If the amount of insurance pay-
ment is in any way dependent on the decision of the insured as well
as on a state of nature, then the effect is much the same as that of
any excise tax and optimality will not be achieved by the competitive
system.” Indeed, the issue of individual shocks is similar to the issue
of individual income taxation—see also our reference to Varian (1980)
in the introduction, and the related discussion.
We focus our discussion on aggregate, sector-wide, shocks; these are
the shocks insured by the government in the previous section. In prin-
ciple, private insurance markets could insure sector A against its aggre-
gate shock in wealth without government intervention (the individual
shocks in sector B remain uninsurable).
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We make two points. The first is empirical: In the cases we care
about (e.g. Agriculture), governments in practice intervene and comple-
ment private insurance. In some instances, no private market provides
insurance independently of the government. The second argument is
theoretical: Trade in Arrow-Debreu securities does not preclude a role
for government.
Empirical evidence on agricultural insurance in the United States
is consistent with a prominent role for the government. As noted by
Chambers (1989), the development of a competitive market for agricul-
tural insurance in the United States has been unsuccessful, and crop
insurance requires a government subsidy. The government subsidizes
crop insurance through the Risk Management Agency of the Depart-
ment of Agriculture and redistributes transfers towards agriculture,
keeping the sector alive instead of compensating farmers for the costs
of relocating to more productive sectors of the economy.
Further, Rodrik (1998) presents evidence that even where private
insurance could soften income shocks, the government provides social
insurance to compensate for aggregate risks to the economy. In par-
ticular, Rodrik finds that a more open economy, which is subject to
greater external shocks by virtue of its openness, correlates with larger
government spending. According to Rodrik, the best explanation for
this correlation is that government spending provides social insurance
against external risk: “Societies seem to demand (and receive) an ex-
panded government role as the price for accepting larger doses of ex-
ternal risk. In other words, government spending appears to provide
social insurance.”
We now turn to a theoretical exploration of private insurance by in-
troducing Arrow-Debreu securities for aggregate, sector-wide, shocks.
We show first how the resulting equilibrium allocation differs from the
one chosen by the government. So the presence of securities does not
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preclude a role for the government. We then consider a specific exam-
ple where we show that, even with a private market in Arrow-Debreu
securities, the less-productive sector would relocate, but government
intervention prevents relocation.
We reproduce first the set-up from our model with a benevolent
government. Let the distribution of wealth in each sector be G, and
let the perfectly-correlated wealth level for all agents in sector A be
wA − α, where wA is drawn from G and α represents the productivity
gap that makes sector A less productive (see Corollary 3).
The government’s choice of transfers (tA, tB) solves the same problem
as in previous sections: The first-order condition gives that, for every
wA,
(3) v′(wA − α+ tA(wA)) =
∫
v′(wB − tA(wA))dG(wB).
To allow for private insurance contracts, we introduce Arrow-Debreu
securities for the uncertain state of the world, represented by the wealth
level wA. Let there be one asset for each level of wA, such that the
asset corresponding to a given state pays off one monetary unit if this
particular state occurs, and zero otherwise. Assume that, prior to the
resolution of uncertainty, there exist markets where agents can trade
these assets in order to share risks and transfer wealth across states.
Denote by pwA be the price of the asset corresponding to state wA.
Consider the maximization problem of a member of group A. Let
qwA be the quantity of the asset corresponding to wealth wA that this
individual buys. Then she has to solve
max
∫
v (wA − α+ qwA) dG(wA)
s.t.
∫
pwAqwAdwA = 0.
The constraint
∫
pwAqwAdwA = 0 is the agent’s budget constraint. If
the agent does not trade, she possesses zero units of each asset. If
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she wishes to insure herself against state wA, contracting to receive
qwA extra monetary units if state of the world wA occurs, then the
cost of this insurance is pwAqwA and the agent must contract to pay
(to receive a negative q) in other states, so that in the aggregate, the
costs and earnings of all amounts contracted to receive or pay in each
state compensate each other. Alternatively, we can interpret that the
agent only buys insurance to receive positive quantities in each state,
but pays an up front fee for this insurance. Then, the budget con-
straint requires that aggregating across all states, the cost of the net
excess of contracted payments minus the fee φ is equal to zero and the
maximization problem is as follows:
max
∫
v(wA − α+ qwA − φ)dG(wA)
s.t.
∫
(pwA(qwA − φ))dwA = 0.
Note that the two interpretations of the maximization problem, ei-
ther with positive and negative contingent payments, or with strictly
positive contingent payments and an up front fee, are equivalent. We
follow the first for ease of notation.
Assume that G has a strictly positive density, g. Then we can write
the Lagrangian for this problem as:
L((qwA);λ) =
∫
{v (wA − α+ qwA)− λqwApwA/g(wA)} dG(wA).
Thus, the first-order condition is, for each wA,
(4) v′ (wA − α+ qwA)− λpwA/g(wA) = 0.
Now consider a member of Group B, who chooses a portfolio (qBwA),
with qBwA being how much she buys of the asset corresponding to level
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of wealth wA. Her maximization problem is
max
∫∫
v
(
wB + q
B
wA
)
dG(wB)dG(wA)
s.t.
∫
pwAq
B
wA
dwA = 0
Using Fubini’s Theorem, the Lagrangian for this problem is
L((qBwA);µ) =
∫ {∫
v
(
wB + q
B
wA
)
dG(wB)− µqBwApwA/g(wA)
}
dG(wA).
Thus, the first-order condition is, for each wA,
(5)
∫
v′
(
wB + q
B
wA
)
dG(wB)− µpwA/g(wA) = 0.
Equilibrium requires that the purchases of qwA and q
B
wA
be in zero
net demand. In a symmetric equilibrium, all A-agents choose the same
qwA and all B-agents the same q
B
wA
. Hence, in equilibrium, qwA = −qBwA .
Let σ = λ/µ. As a consequence of (4) and (5), we have
(6) v′ (wA − α+ qwA) = σ
∫
v′ (wB − qwA) dG(wB).
Compare (3) and (6): The market outcome corrects some of the
inequalities in wealth, but it does not coincide with the outcome chosen
by the government. In equilibrium, the ratio of expected marginal
utilities in each sector is constant across states, but one sector is better
off than the other in all states. A relaxation of the budget constraint
is more valuable for the worse-off sector: so σ 6= 1, as the Lagrange
multiplier is higher for the worse-off sector. The government strives
to equalize marginal utilities, but this is not what the market achieves
because the market does not correct the inequality induced by the
productivity gap α, it only equalizes based on what it can insure.
The market solution for the risk-bearing problem given by the Arrow-
Debreu equilibrium differs from the benevolent government solution
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because the government transfers not only provide insurance for risk-
bearing, they also redistribute wealth in favor of the poor, increasing
utilitarian social welfare.
Redistribution enables private insurance to operate, and allows the
less productive sector to survive. We illustrate this point using a nu-
merical example. The example illustrates how private insurance mar-
kets fail to preserve a less productive sector: all A-agents would migrate
to the uninsurable but more productive sector of the economy. Yet, the
government’s redistributive transfers keep sector A alive. In the exam-
ple, the market provides the insurance provided by the government in
previous sections of our model. However, the government intervention
is crucial for sustaining the sector and allowing the insurance market
to operate.
Example 5. Let wA equal either 1 or 2 with equal probability. Let
α = 0.1 and let wi = wA − α for any i ∈ A. For each j ∈ B, let wj
equal either 1 or 2 with equal probability. Let the realizations of wj be
independent. Let v be piece-wise linear, with
v′(x) =
{
1 if x ≤ 1.6
0.5 if x > 1.6
In the absence of private insurance markets or government transfers,
expected utility is 1.325 for A-agents and 1.4 for B-agents. Therefore,
if A-agents can relocate to sector B, they do so. After the relocation
the average expected utility is 1.4.
In the equilibrium of the Arrow-Debreu economy, A-agents have a
weak incentive to relocate and let the sector collapse, despite the pro-
vision of private insurance. Let there be state-contingent assets 1 and
2 that pay respectively one monetary unit if wA = 1 and one monetary
unit if wA = 2,. In equilibrium, the relative price of the two assets
is 1, A-agents buy 0.3 units of asset 1 and sell 0.3 units of asset 2 to
B-agents. Expected wealth for (A,B)-agents is (1.4, 1.5) and expected
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utility is (1.4, 1.4), so A-agents are indifferent about relocating (and
an infinitesimal decline in the productivity of sector A would break the
indifference, precipitating the relocation).
On the other hand, government intervention guarantees that A-
agents have a strict incentive to remain in their sector, and it increases
utilitarian social welfare. The government optimal solution is to set
transfers from B to A contingent on wA in quantity t(1) = 0.4 and
t(2) = −0.3 so that the expected transfer in favor of A is 0.05, ex-
pected post-transfer wealth is 1.45 in both sectors and expected utility
in sectors (A,B) is (1.45, 1.3625) for an average expected utility of
1.406.
Alternatively, the government can reach its constrained optimal so-
lution letting private insurance markets operate, and distorting the
equilibrium by imposing a transfer t(1) = 0.1.6 The government inter-
vention with active private insurance markets consists on a subsidy to
sustain activity in sector A. This subsidy allows sector A to survive
and makes it possible for private markets to insure the sector.
Note that the government can either impose only the minimal real-
location that would then lead private markets to reach the utilitarian
optimum in equilibrium, or, given that some form of intervention is
necessary, it may instead impose larger transfers to reach the optimal
solution directly, bypassing the markets. This is a possible explanation
for government administered insurance, as documented by Chambers
(1989).
6Trades and prices in the equilibrium of the Arrow-Debreu economy described
above do not change when agents take into account the government transfer from
B to A.
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Example 5 captures wealth risks and decreasing marginal utility
crudely to make calculations trivial, but the insight is powerful: Pri-
vate markets and risk-bearing contracts would not maintain the less-
productive sector A. Redistributive transfers dictated by the govern-
ment insure the sector and make it viable, and the insurability of the
subsidized sector increases the aggregate social welfare relative to the
equilibrium with private insurance markets.
In our paper we have studied an instance of this social insurance:
Redistributive transfers to a less productive sector with correlated in-
come shocks. We have shown that sustaining the sector with transfers
becomes a constrained efficient, second-best outcome. We have shown
that even if private markets for risk-sharing exist, not only a benev-
olent government concerned with social welfare but also a politically
motivated government concerned with winning elections would deviate
from the competitive equilibrium to insure a less productive sector with
redistributive, state-contingent transfers.
Testable Implications
The main implication of our results is that we should observe a high
correlation of incomes in sectors that receive transfers. The US data on
household incomes in different sectors is in line with this implication:
Incomes in agriculture, the textile industry, and the steel industry are
more highly correlated than the average sector. We also discuss the
possible link between factor specificity and redistributive transfers.
A higher correlation of incomes in a sector implies that we should
observe less variance of income in our sample of households of the
sector. It may be clear intuitively that this is true, but it also follows
from some simple calculations: Suppose (X1, . . . Xn) is a sample from
some population random variable X, with variance σ2, and such that
each pair Xi and Xj has correlation ρ. Then, using S
2 to denote the
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sample variance, it turns out that the expected sample variance is:
ES2 =
(
n2 − n+ 2
n2
)
(1− ρ)σ2
(we omit the trivial, but cumbersome, derivation). Thus there is a
negative relation between correlation and dispersion around the sample
mean. Our theory implies a smaller dispersion of incomes in the sectors
that receive transfers.
We study household-income data from 1968 to 2003 in the US.7 We
focus on three sectors, which the literature identifies as recipients of
transfers (Hufbauer and Elliott, 1994): agriculture, textiles, and steel.
We use the industrial classification of the 1950 Census Bureau, for
which there are 146 sectors in the economy.8
We calculate the standard deviation of individual income for each
sector and year, first deflating incomes by the average economy-wide
income. The deflation makes data across years comparable, and atten-
uates aggregate shocks. We then compute the average, across years,
standard deviation in the three sectors of interest. The following table
presents the results, and the average economy-wide standard deviation.
The numbers in the table are consistent with our models’ testable
implication.
Are the deviations significantly lower than average? To compare the
deviations of income in agriculture, textiles and steel to those in the
other sectors in the economy, we order the sectors (after weighting
them by size) according to their income deviations, and we find the
7Current Population Survey data (Bureau of Labor Statistics), obtained from the
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series provided by Minnesota Population Center
at the University of Minnesota. Overall sample size is about 2.6 million observa-
tions; in Agriculture, for example, we have about 2, 500 on average per year. The
data is available at http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~jon/.
8In the classification, our three sectors are “Agriculture,” “Apparel and acces-
sories,” and “Blast furnaces, steel works and rolling mills.”
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Sector Std. dev. Percentile
Agriculture 0.628 33
Textiles 0.537 7
Steel 0.509 3
Average sector 0.671
Table 1. Standard deviation of sectoral income.
percentiles at which agriculture, textile and steel locate in the resulting
distribution. The numbers are in the second column of the table, and
confirm that there is less dispersion in these three sectors than in most
other sectors.9 The result is clearest for textiles and steel, for which less
than 7% and 3%, respectively, of the sectors have smaller deviations.
We note that we would prefer to compare individual correlations in
income to the more indirect method of comparing standard deviations.
But the data needed for computing individual correlations is not in the
public domain.
Our theory offers a second testable hypothesis, with regards to the
use of specific factors of production in sectors that receive subsidies.
Factors of production specific to a sector are factors that are used
predominantly in one sector, and cannot easily be relocated to another
sector. Our theory implies—somewhat indirectly—that sectors with
specific factors should be prone to receiving transfers. The implication
is in line with some of the previous literature, such as Baldwin (1989),
Brainard and Verdier (1994) or Alt et al. (1996), and with existing em-
pirical evidence (Zahariadis, 2001).10 But there is controversy about
the relation between factor specificity and transfers: Acemoglu and
9If the reader is concerned about scale effects, we note that we get qualitatively
the same results when we use the coefficient of variation instead of the standard
deviation.
10Zahariadis (2001) studies 13 OECD countries and concludes that factor speci-
ficity has a significant positive effect on the amount of sectoral transfers. More
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Robinson (2001) argue that transfers are negatively related to speci-
ficity.
We find two possible links between our theory and the effect of factor
specificity on the amount of sectoral transfers.
First, it is plausible that some specific factors also represent a large
fraction of the incomes in their respective sectors. For example, skilled
labor is often both specific, and an important line in the industry’s cost
structure. In that case, shocks to the sector (or to the factor) result in
a high correlation of the incomes in the sector. Our theory then implies
that the sector is expensive to buy out; hence, we should observe that
sectors with specific factors receive transfers.
This first link is a direct consequence of the theory, under the addi-
tional assumption on the importance of the specific factors in a sector.
Our second link is possibly valid more generally, but has a less direct
relation to our theory: it focuses on the insurance value of the transfers
to sectors who suffer asymmetric shocks, rather than to sectors with
correlated income.
A sector which employs a specific factor is subject to income shocks
caused by fluctuations in the productivity or cost of this factor. These
shocks need not be correlated with the shocks to the productivity of
the factors employed in other sectors. Thus, we expect a sector with
specific factors to have income shocks that are less correlated with
the general state of the economy than the income shocks of sectors
which all rely in the same common factors of production. When a
sector suffers an asymmetric shock that does not affect other sectors,
the overall economy is in better conditions to afford transfers to the
affected sector, while sectors whose shocks are correlated are in need of
transfers precisely when the economy as a whole cannot afford them.
indirectly, Alt et al. (1999), in a case-study of Norway, argues that specificity is
positively related to the pressure for transfers.
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As a result, sectors with asymmetric shocks become more likely targets
of redistributive transfers with an insurance purpose.
Conclusion
Redistributive policies, such as subsidies and tariffs, distort the in-
centives to locate resources efficiently in the most productive sectors of
the economy. It is a well-known puzzle why governments fail to redis-
tribute wealth using lump-sum transfers, which do not introduce such
distortion.
We have provided a solution to this puzzle: State-dependent sub-
sidies to a sector with high income correlation provide an insurance
value to the members of the sector which is superior to the value of
the expected transfer. To provide the same level of welfare with a
lump-sum grant, the government would have to finance an additional
compensation for members of cohesive groups.
We have also discussed the testable implications of this model. The
most straightforward implication is that, in sectors that receive trans-
fers, income correlation ought to be high. Again, we have presented
some suggestive evidence that this is the case. A conclusive empirical
study, fleshing out the testable implications of the different explana-
tions of inefficient redistribution, is called for, but beyond the scope of
this paper.
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